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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National	Intelligence	Officers
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NFAC 6140-81 29 September 1981

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Director of Central Intelligence MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence National Intelligence Officer for Warning VIA: Charles E. Waterman FROM: National Intelligence Officer for NESA Monthly Warning Meeting - September 1981 SUBJECT: 1. Concern about possible repercussions from the tripartite treaty recently concluded by Libya, Ethiopia, and South Yemen centers on the possibility of a hostile response to the scheduled US military exercise BRIGHT STAR. The high profile exercise will involve more than 5,000 US troops in the Sudan, Somalia, Oman and Egypt who will engage in a broad range of training activities including air drops, amphibious landings, and unconventional warfare. While such a large exercise could have elicited a hostile response on the part of Libyan Teader Qadhafi, the existence of the treaty could lend psychological support to the signatories (or their Palestinian assets) to engage in hostile activities. 25X1 2. As to the Soviet role: Moscow very likely encouraged the negotiations that led to conclusion of the treaty and may well have lobbied on its behalf with the governments involved. While the Soviets would have preferred a more inclusive Arab grouping -- including Syria, Algeria and the PLO -to counter the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US RDJTF, they clearly are pleased with this arrangement and will gladly reap whatever benefits come 25X1 their way. 25X1 4. Saudi reaction to a possible turndown by the US Congress of the

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AWACS sale will most likely be gradual and will take the form of a growing

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detachment from the US and an effort to secure alternative sources of arms in Western Europe. While the position of some strongly pro-US members of the royal family might suffer as a result of a turndown, the stability of the regime is not likely to be gravely threatened. At some point in the future -- not yet discernible -- the Saudis may feel impelled to take some action that, even if painful for them, will make clear that their relationship with the US cannot remain unchanged. The inevitable incidents involving Hajj pilgrims occurring in the coming weeks likely will be portrayed by critics of the Saudis as demonstrating their inability to control radicals/terrorists.

- 5. Israel continues to play up the frequency of PLO violations of the ceasefire in Lebanon and has reiterated publicly that it cannot be expected to have unlimited patience. While the ongoing AWACS debate in Congress may inhibit the Israelis from a preemptive strike, several members of the Begin government are pressing for a major ground operation in southern Lebanon. Even a mildly provocative act could spark a serious Israeli response on the ground.
- 6. President Sadat's crackdown on Muslim fundamentalists and Coptic Christians has elicited a much milder response than many had anticipated. While the opening of the universities will provide the opportunity for opposition-sponsored activities, Sadat has made clear that he will use his security services to prevent any anti-regime activities.

Charles E. Waterman

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